- Daniel Lincoln
- Mar 16
- 8 min read
On December 16, 2025, the Alberta Court of Appeal did something no Canadian appellate court has done before: it struck down a statutory oath of allegiance requirement for admission to the bar as unconstitutional.
In Wirring v Law Society of Alberta, the Court held that Alberta’s requirement that aspiring lawyers swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown infringes freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) and cannot be justified under section 1.[1] Thus, the oath is no longer required for bar admission in Alberta.
The ruling, despite initial appearances, is not about monarchism versus republicanism. Rather, it is about the limits of compelled allegiance in a constitutional democracy that guarantees freedom of conscience and religion.
The Claim: Allegiance to Nothing but the Guru
Prabjot Singh Wirring, an amritdhari Sikh, had completed his articles and sought admission to the Alberta bar. His objection to the oath of allegiance was theological, and not political, in nature.[2]
As an amritdhari Sikh, Mr. Wirring has sworn complete and unqualified allegiance to Akal Purakh, the Creator, and the scripture of the Guru Granth Sahib.[3] This prohibited him, he argued, from swearing allegiance to any other figure or entity, including the Canadian monarch, as required by the Legal Profession Act.[4] Mr. Wirring accordingly challenged the constitutionality of the oath, alleging that it unjustifiably violated his religious freedom, as guaranteed by section 2(a) of the Charter.[5]
At first instance, the Court of King’s Bench dismissed his claim, treating the oath as symbolic and thus not at odds with his religious beliefs.[6] In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge reasoned that the oath of allegiance compelled allegiance not to a person, but to the abstract concepts of constitutional government and the rule of law.[7] The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed.
A Palpable Error and a Constitutional Violation
The Court of Appeal’s decisive move was conceptual, with the Court holding that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error in characterizing Mr. Wirring’s religious beliefs.[8]
The uncontested evidence established that Mr. Wirring’s religion prohibited him from swearing allegiance to any entity other than those to which he had already sworn allegiance as an Amritdhari Sikh.[9]
In the Court’s view, this concept of “allegiance” — particularly “true allegiance” — denotes a commitment that goes beyond ordinary support or endorsement, to the point of implying a sense of priority and loyalty of a heightened order.[10] For someone whose faith expressly and preclusively forbids such a commitment, requiring it as a condition of professional entry creates a coercive choice: violate religious convictions or forfeit admission.[11] This, in the Court’s view, constituted a clear violation of section 2(a) of the Charter.[12]
Why the Oath Wasn’t Saved by Section 1 of the Charter
The more consequential aspect of the decision lies in its section 1 analysis. Under section 1 of the Charter, a law that is found to violate a guaranteed right can be saved if it is proven to constitute “a reasonable limit” that is “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”[13] This captures the idea that Charter rights, despite their importance, are not absolute, but must be balanced against often-conflicting broader societal imperatives.
The province advanced an entirely orthodox objective to justify the section 2(a) violation: preserving and promoting the rule of law and Canada’s constitutional system. This objective was of greater importance in light of the status of legal practitioners as the stewards entrusted to uphold these sacrosanct principles. As succinctly stated by the Court, “Lawyers have a significant effect on the system’s ability to live up to the rule of law. Because of this influence, lawyers have special responsibilities to practice in ways that serve the ideals of constitutional government and the rule of law that underpins it.”[14]
The Court accepted that this objective was pressing and substantial.[15] However, to justify a law under section 1 of the Charter, the government must also show that the law is proportionate, meaning that it is rationally connected to the objective, minimally impairing of rights, and strikes a reasonable balance between positive and negative effects.[16]
At the minimal impairment stage of the section 1 test, Alberta faltered. The province offered essentially no evidence that requiring an oath of allegiance was necessary to achieve its stated objective.[17] Nor did it explain why less impairing alternatives — such as personal commitments to uphold a certain standard of integrity and competence — were insufficient to accomplish this goal.[18]
Comparative evidence also cut against the province. Other jurisdictions have removed the oath, made it optional, or softened its language without seeing resulting destabilization or compromising the integrity of their legal systems. As found by the Court, “Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Yukon, and Ontario have made the oath of allegiance optional for admission to the bar. British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island have removed it entirely. Alberta did not claim the rule of law and constitutional government in those provinces are at risk because they do not require an oath of allegiance.”[19]
At the proportionality stage of the section 1 test, the evidentiary gap became evident. Alberta produced no evidence of tangible benefits flowing from the oath requirement.[20] In the balance between harms and beneficial effects, the Court found that the burden on religious freedom was concrete and uncontested, while the salutary effects were largely asserted but unsubstantiated.[21]
The result, then, was that the oath requirement could not be saved in the Court’s view. The Court therefore declared the impugned provision of the Legal Profession Act to be of no force or effect under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.[22]
This doesn’t get rid of all professional oaths, but only the distinct statutory requirement to swear “true allegiance” to the sovereign as a precondition of entry to a profession. Oaths that focus on professional commitments to specific values (e.g. integrity), by contrast, remain unaffected.[23]
Why This Decision Resonates
Three broader implications illustrate the importance of Wirring beyond Alberta’s jurisdiction.
Firstly, it suggests that compelled allegiance may be doctrinally fragile under the framework of the Charter. Canadian courts have historically upheld citizenship oaths and other loyalty rituals by interpreting them “objectively” as symbolic of constitutional order. As held by the Ontario Court of Appeal in McAteer v Canada (Attorney General), “Although the Queen is a person, in swearing allegiance to the Queen of Canada, the would-be citizen is swearing allegiance to a symbol of our form of government.”[24]
Rather than undoing this long-standing interpretation, Wirring reframes the issue. Even if allegiance is directed abstractly to constitutional government rather than personally to a monarch, it remains an oath of allegiance. For certain claimants, that form of commitment itself violates religious obligations. That logic potentially widens the terrain of future challenges far beyond sensationalized and politicized objections to Canada’s status as a constitutional monarchy.
Secondly, Wirring turns on a very specific framing of section 1 by insisting that hard evidence is needed for government lawyers to succeed in justifying a law that clashes with the Charter.
The message from the Court is clear: governments defending rights-limiting statutory requirements must show clearly and unambiguously how these conditions advance their objectives in practice, and why less intrusive alternatives are insufficient. Different courts have insisted on this to different degrees, but there is at least consistency across time in the idea that sentimental appeals to heritage or established historical practice fail to discharge the onerous legal burden of section 1 justification.[25]
Finally, while it leaves Canada’s political and legal architecture largely undisturbed, Wirring touches upon a broader moment in the country’s evolving constitutional story. The reality is that monarchy remains embedded in Canada’s constitutional fabric and its political and legal institutions. Parliamentary oaths are constitutionally entrenched under section 128 of the Constitution Act, 1867,[26] and are thus insulated from similar challenges (as one part of the Constitution cannot limit or abrogate another).
However, Wirring demonstrates that statutory loyalty requirements are not immune from Charter scrutiny simply because they reflect constitutional heritage. It remains to be seen how the decision in Wirring could impact other oaths, such as the one required to become a member of the Canadian Armed Forces — another oath that’s prescribed by statute and hence vulnerable to an analogous legal challenge.
Conclusion: The Shadow of Big M
In its totality, Wirring is perhaps best understood not as a dramatic constitutional rupture, but as an heir to the early Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence that first articulated the meaning of religious freedom under the Charter. Decisions such as Big M[27] and R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd[28] established an enduring core principle: section 2(a) of the Charter is fundamentally concerned with preventing the state from coercing individuals toward or away from religious commitments. That principle does not merely restrain overt religious compulsion; it also limits the state’s ability to impose practices that compel individuals to choose between civic participation and fidelity to their religious beliefs.
Seen in this light, the reasoning in Wirring fits squarely within that constitutional tradition. The case does not question Canada’s constitutional monarchy, nor does it deny the historical significance of loyalty rituals embedded within the country’s institutional life. Rather, it reiterates a foundational Charter message: the persistence of a practice, even one woven deeply into the fabric of Canadian public culture, cannot by itself justify coercion that interferes with individual religious obligations. Tradition alone is insufficient as a constitutional answer.
What the Charter demands instead is justification grounded in reason and evidence. Where the state compels individuals to undertake acts that genuinely conflict with sincerely held religious beliefs, it must show why that coercion is necessary and why less intrusive alternatives are unavailable. In Wirring, Alberta failed to do so. The Court of Appeal therefore applied the logic first articulated in Big M: the legitimacy of state action must be measured not by the age of a practice, but by whether it can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
That is ultimately why the decision matters. Wiring illustrates that even longstanding institutional practices remain subject to the discipline of Charter reasoning. When the state asks individuals to perform acts that touch upon conscience or religious obligation, historical continuity alone will not suffice; what must prevail instead is the rule of reason.
***
Daniel Lincoln is a 1L student at the University of Alberta and is the Managing Editor of the Centre for Constitutional Studies' Seven/Fifty Blog
[1] Wirring v Law Society of Alberta, 2025 ABCA 413 [Wirring ABCA]; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
[2] Ibid at para 6.
[3] Ibid at para 21.
[4] Ibid at paras 2, 68; Legal Profession Act, RSA 2000, c L-8, s 44(2)(a).
[5] Wirring ABCA, supra note 1 at para 7.
[6] Ibid at para 8, citing Wirring v Law Society, 2023 ABKB 580 [Wirring ABKB].
[7] Wirring ABCA, supra note 1 at para 8, citing Wirring ABKB, supra note 6.
[8] Wirring ABCA, supra note 1 at para 61.
[9] Ibid at para 68.
[10] Ibid at paras 85, 92.
[11] Ibid at para 94.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Charter, supra note 1.
[14] Wirring ABCA, supra note 1 at para 87.
[15] Ibid at para 100.
[16] Ibid at paras 97, 102.
[17] Ibid at para 102.
[18] Ibid at paras 102-04.
[19] Ibid at para 105.
[20] Ibid at para 107.
[21] Ibid at paras 107-12.
[22] Ibid at para 113.
[23] Ibid at paras 18, 115.
[24] McAteer v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 578 at para 54.
[25] See e.g. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 351-52 [Big M].
[26] Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 128, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
[27] Big M, supra note 25.
[28] R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 713.